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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OLOF NELSON CONSTRVCTION
COMPANY, VINCENT- PETERS 0 N CONSTRUCTION CO:MPANY, GRONE~IA.N & C0~1PANY, YOUNG & S~IITH CONSTRt:"CTION COMPANY, UTAH
CONSTRUCTION C0~1P ANY,
Petitioners and Appellants,
Case No.
7633

vs.

THE INDPSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and THE BOARD OF
REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE
and CLAI~IS SUPERVISOR of
its DEPARTMENT OF E~1PLOY
~IENT SECURITY, and JOSEPH
B. ALLMAN ET AL.,
Respondents and Appellees.
BRIEF OF UTAH STATE FEDERATION OF
LABOR IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES
The Utah State Federation of Labor appear here
as amicus curiae by permission of the Court.
The Statement of Facts set out in Respondents
Brief is adopted.
1
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ARGUMENT
At the outset we especially invite the court's attention to the following factors which we deem of importance.
The claimants, for unemployn1ent compensation herein, at no time were employed by the Associated General
Contractors, and bore no relationship to them as such.
The Associated General Contractors were and are in no
sense en1ployers in this n1atter. The claimants herein
for unemployment compensation were at no time emloyed by or were working at a struck plant or job. The
claimants at all of the time herein 1nentioned were ready,
able and anxious to work at their jobs. There is no dispute, that such claimants were the victims of the opposite
of a strike, that is to say, they were deliberately and unilaterly locked out from their jobs by their employer,
against their will and without their consent. The Industrial Conrmission found that claimants did not foment
a strike; that there was no strike at the job or the jobestablishment at which they worked. The precipitate of
the philosophy of the Statute and the question here to be
resolved rests almost entirely on the involuntary unemployment status of these employes seeking relief from
lost wages.
The Petitioners freely admit, but in a sort of confssion and avoidance manner, the simple and precise
issue herein involved when they say on page 13 of their
Brief:
"In recent years the increased frequency of
large scale industrial controversies has sharply
2
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accentuated the problmn of the applicability of
disqualification provisions to elaimants whose unemploynlent, while rP~ulting from a labor dispute
or strike is wlwlly i 11 voluntary. Clai1nants in the
instant ca~e received the benefit of the wage
increa~e resulting fron1 their ~trike, their duly
appointed respresentative:-; called the strike
against the twe 1ne1nber~ of the bargaining unit,
and for that reason their une1nployment was, perhaps. not involuntary." (E1nphasis ours.)
Petitioners may not rely on subsection (d) of 42-2a-5,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, because that
statute by explicit language and by express legislative
intent deals exclusively with a strike or struck plant. It
reads:
''an individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(d) For any week it is found by the commission that his employ1nent is due to a stoppage
of work which exists because of a strike involving
his grade, class or group of workers at the factory
or establish1nent at which he is or was last employed." (En1phasis ours.)
These claimants apparently had just the opposite
intention of quitting their jobs voluntarily, and that
obviously is the very reason why they so vigorously
sought after their work and as a result of their evident
intention to continue working at their jobs the employers arbitrarily and one-sidedly locked these claimants
out. The economic coercion, the economic sanction and
the economic squeeze was not on the part of the employees, hut on the part of their e1nployers. Hence, the
n·a~on becomes very evident why the Petitioner argues

3
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and relies upon subsection ( 1) of subsection (d) of
42-2a-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, which
reads as follows:
"(1) If the con1mission upon investigation,
shall find that a strike has been fomented by a
worker of any employer, none of the workers of
the grade, class, or group of workers of the
individual who is found to be a party to such
plan, or agreement to foment a strike, shall be
eligible for benefits; * * *." (Emphasis ours)
The language used in this section may be unhappy
and the result of many compromises in legislative committees, but the intention is quite clear. The subsection
is supposed to take care of what is sometimes known
as the quickie, wildcat or unauthorized strike, where
some individual in a plant starts agitating for better
conditions or wages, and to achieve the results foments
dissension and unrest among his fellow servants, so
quite naturally, when a worker of "any employer" who
is a fellow worker of the "individual" and is a party to
such plan, foments a strike he is not eligible for unemployment compensation; for the very simple and underlying reason, that such fellow servant of such fomenter
of such strike does not occupy an involuntary status;
under the provisions of the statute he is an integral part
and parcel of the plan or agreement to foment the strike,
hence, ineligible to benefits. It is quite plain, this last
section of the statute, upon which Petitioners principally
rely, bears little or no relationship to the issues here to
be determined, respecting these claimants application
for unemployment cmnpensation, and actually is of rela-
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tive uniinportance, because the faet i~, that there was no
claimant fmnenting a strike, and there was no strike at
the locked out job. There wa~ no fellow worker available
that eould plan or agree or conspire to fmnent a strike
unlest' he wanted to defeat hi~ own welfare. The best
evidence of what the clailuants intended is from what
they did-they tried to head off a strike in~tead of causing a strike by eagerly presenting the1nselves for work.
Petitioners .say on page 1-l- of their Brief:
'"The r nions in this case ordered a strike
at only two construction finns hoping to be
secure in the knowledge that such a course would
as effectively induce a cmnplete work stoppage as
would a strike against all1ne1nbers of the bargaining unit and that state benefit payn1ent of all nonstriking n1en1bers would appreciably lessen the
drain upon the union's treasury by requiring the
union to finance only a s1nall scale strike. As a
matter of fact the Unions knew and had been
notified several times during negotiations that a
strike against one would be considered a strike
against all."
Now assume we go one step further and add to this
hypothesis, of the Petitioner, that the various Unions
involved planned to raise then1selves up by their own
boot straps through assessing all of the e1nployees who
were left working at the non-struck plants, and to supplement the benefits received by the striking e1nployees
for unemployn1ent compensation. How, and in what
manner, does that concept ehange the obvious intention
of the Statute, which provides in substance, that a worker
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is only ineligible for unernployu1ent cmnpensation when
and if a work stoppage is a result of a strike at the
establishn1ent at which he was last employed. Not a
single one of these applicants for unemploy1nent compensation was involved in a strike or working in or at
or connected with a struck plant. rrhe theory that any
individual union, here under consideration, caused a
work stoppage or strike to be brought about at the Paul
and Barker jobs, and nmy have or rnay not have intended
to assess the rne1nbers of their respective unions, remaining at work and thus to contribute supple1nentary benefits to unernployment cmnpensation benefits to the
strikers; and rnay have intended to demonstrate economic
sanction to the ernployers; or may have intended to pick
one en1ployer off at a ti1ne; or rnay have intended to
divide the e1nployers; or 1nay have intended to soften the
demand on their treasuries, adds nothing to a determination of this issue pursuant to this statute, for the reason
that if some employer locks out his employees and such
employee finds hi1nself out of a job as a result of an
involuntary status on his part he is entitled per se to
unemploy1nent con1pensation benefits under the statute.
The action of the en1ployers in this matter wa~
wholly arbitrary, wholly one-sided and so far as the
locked-out clain1ants are concerned, wholly uncalled for
and a downright intention on the part of the employer
to coerce the claimants into sulnnitting to wages and
conditions fixed and arbitrarily dictated hy the employers.
6
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~;;

'Vhy are the employers here seeking to block and
obstruct these locked-out clain1ant ~mployees fro1n recovering what the statute says they are entitled to. If
they prevail, is it not obvious, that they serve notice
here and now, that the next tilne the e1nployers have an
occasion to lock out their e1nployees under sin1ilar economic circumstances such ernployees will be without unemployment cmnpensation and will be softened up to
come crawling back and glad to work, seeking the status
quo. If these employers can defeat the statute by reversing the process of striking first then they would indeed
have a mighty econmnic weapon over their employees
and this n1ay be precisely what they are maneuvering
for. There is a slogan in n1ilitary affairs, that the best
defense is a good offense, hence it is conceivable that
in the future, if these unemployment compensation benefits are unavailable under such unilateral technique we
may be hearing more about lockouts than we do strikes.
Assume that the Petitioners here were to win this
case upon son1e circumloquitous theory or legerdemain
doge, that these locked-out clai1nants were somehow
eager and avid strikers and not involuntary lockouts,
and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation
under the wording of subsection (1) of subsection (d)
of 42-2a-5, and in some strange and indirect manner
connected in with son1e individual of the grade, class or
group of workers who fomented a strike. The difficulty
then to be encountered, under such hypothesis, is that
no matter how 1nuch fomenting was thought or sur1nised
to have been done, actually no strike ensued at the last
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place of clailnants employment, .and still the further
difficulty to be encountered is that the Industrial Comnlission has already found, as a matter of fact, that there
was no strike at the last place of entployment of claimants and that clain1ant~ unemployment status was involuntary.
IMPHAC'ri CAL ADniiNISrrRATION OF
THE ACT
What happens to the administration of the Unemployment Compensation Act when the minds, motives,
and intentions of the respective leaders of all these
respective local unions are sought to be explored-a
rather strange and wholly impracticable application
devolves on the Industrial Commission, for in each case
they would find themselves required to go far beyond
the objective standards set up by the Act, in such plain
language, and resort to a guessing and speculating
procedure, respecting the subjective Inotives and explore
the thinking of the construction trade union officers and
others and otherwise in order to fix the eligibility status
of each claimant. This would create quite a Donnybrook
Fair, for the employer would always claim, under subsection (1) of subsection (d) of the Act that a worker
on some job conspired with another worker and he with
another to the end that an attributed intention is superiinposed on some imaginary strike action, and thus the
apprehensive eutployer could claint an excuse to lock out
his employees and contend, in the terms of subsection
(1), that he is under strike status, and his employees
8
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without benefit of unen1ploy1nent cmnpensation, a source
of revenue under involuntary unmnployment statuH,
available when it is nwst deHperately needed. There
most alway~ ensues a turgid n1elange of effusions emanating front partisan u1inds when representatives of labor
and managetnen t gather around the bargaining table ;
they huff, they puff and they bluff down to the last
penny of money and last 1ninute of time, and sometimes
they even tell their respective shareholders and membership how lucky they are to be so well representedbut is all this planning, schen1ing and maneuvering, on
the part of agents of industry and labor, the business
of the Industrial Conunission in determining the merits
of an unemoplyment compensation claim, where the
worker took no part in a strike, but on the contrary presented himself for work-then finds himself locked out
of his job, between vice and versae, bewildered and
flabbergasted because his boss says he is on an nonexistent strike. The fact that the claimant under these
facts is a union member has no more bearing on the case
than if he were a Republican or Democrat-because
neither the organization or the claimant participated
in anywise whatsoever in a strike at the employer's jobestablishment; indeed the Industrial Comn1ission so
found that there was no strike at claimants job-establishment and his unemployn1ent status was involuntary, so
how this Court can up-set such findings, predicated on
~mch

facts, is beyond our poor power to conceive.
9
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ASSOCIArrED GEXERAL CONTHACTORS
STATUS
rrhe Associated General Contradors are not in the
construction business, as such. It does not haYe an
establishment, facton' or plant, and it has no grade,
group or elass of en1ployees. It wa~ the Associated
General Contractors who served a unilateral notice on
all of the unions involved, that if a strilm against one
contractor be declared, it \\·ould be deemed a strike
against all.
rt,here was a strike at the Paul and Barker job~, but
the clairnants, here under consideration, had absolutely
no connection with such jobs, directly or indirectly. 11heir
sole ernployment was at the job where there wa~ no
strike, but from "'hich they were respectively locked out.
We are not here dealing with labor relations, as such,
or with a- labor dispute, as such. vVe are here dealing
with specifically one matter, to-wit: l;nemployment
Compensation. The Court may search the contract between the respective unions and the contractors and no
where will appear one scintilla that a union or the unions
collectively, must strike all or none of the contractors,
and no where will one scintilla appear that the Associated General Contractors, the non-en1ployers here,
agree or are required to shut down all construction joh:-;
when only one job is struck. This all or none busine1-i:-;
is an after thought; an arbitrary one-sided device of the
contractors to defeat the Unemployment Compensation
Act, and whip these claimants into submission. The
As~ociatecl General Contradors eannot unilatPrnlly eon-
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vert a ~trike on one joh into a general lockout to defeat
the Une1nployu1ent Cmupensation Act, any nwre than
they can conyert a ~ow~ l'ar into a ~ilk purse. Ad1nittedl~,,
the As8ociated General Contraetor~ bargained for all of
the~e contractors-but what of it-what right does that
gin:• them to ~tep over into foreign territory, not under
the Xational Labor Relation~ .\et or the Utah Labor
l\elations ~\d, but into the field of the Unernployn1ent
Compensation Aet, and defeat the obvious purpose of
thi:; ..Aet, by declaring arbitrarily, without negotiation
with the unions and ~trongly against their \viii and
wholly outside the collective bargaining contract, that
a strike against one job will be considered, by one side,
a strike against all, and following up this device, they
throw out the baby with the bath, by locking out all employees. That sounds too umch like the Nevada Justice
of the Peace, who held: "If the defendant didn't do this,
mehby he done sun1pin' else, so into the cooler he goes,
an~,"·a~· and besides the Sheriff's wife ain't got many
Loarders lately."
PUl1POSl£ OF STRII{:E BEARS NO
RELATIONSHIP rro UNEJ\lPLOYMENT
CO~lPENSATION

Assume the work stoppage at the Paul and Barker
.Jobs was unlawful and in plain controvention of the
contract, and in opposition to the provisions of the N ationa! Labor Relations Aet, etc., ete. The Industrial
(jomJn iss ion would not he concerned with all of these
t•xtruneou;...; mattt~r;...;: that is to say, whether a strike was

11
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legal or illegal at the Paul and Barker jobs makes no
difference in the premises. All the Industrial Commission is concerned with, in the instant case, is whether
these clain1ants were unemployed on an involuntary
status in the absence of a strike, and that, it so happens,
is just what the Industrial Comn1ission did find.
STRIKE NOT CAUSE OF CLAIMANTS
UNEMPLOYMENT
The strike at the Paul and Barker jobs, is not the
sole or proximate cause of the lockout. That could not
possibly have happened because of the sequence of
events. The direct, sole and proximate cause of the
lockout was just the opposite of the reason for striking
the Paul and Barker jobs. It would seem that what the
employers were seeking to do, by way of the lockout,
was to eventually establish the economic status quo.
Assume that all of the garages in this state from St.
George to Logan formed a state wide automotive garage
association, and thereafter said to the Machinists Union,
who have them all organized, if you strike the garage
in Smithfield, with whom you are having a labor dispute, we will close all other garages in the entire state.
Now if by that device the garage employees at Kanosh,
Kanab and Koosharem are locked out and such employees are forced, against their will, into an unemployed
status-would this Court permit this garage association
to substitute its interpretation and judgment for the
interpretation and judgment of the Industrial Commission, as here the Associated General Contractors are at12
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tempting to do. OhYiously it was the affinnativP, voluntary attion of the en1ployer~ whieh brought about these
claimants applieation for unemployment eompensation;
~ole employer eonduct over whieh the~e claimants had no
control, but on the contrary exereised diligenee to for~tall, and head off; ~o the end result, it would seem, is
that the As~oeiated General Contractors are attempting
to take a pre1nimn frorn their own one sided in1position
and at the smne ti1ne ··soak" their e1nployees a penalty
for being a peaceful unwilling victi1nized easualt:·.

N"O YOLUKTARY ~TOPP AGE OF 'VORl( BY
CLAIMANTS
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that
the employers closed down their jobs and laid off their
workmen. See Appellants' Brief Page 7. This closing
down by the e1nployers, in the construction industry,
was in accord with a predetennined agree1nent between
the various employers cmnprising the Associated General
Contraetors. The clai1nants here had nothing to do with
this closing dmvn of the jobs, and this is further shown
by the fact that they presented then1selves at their respective jobs ready and willing to go to work
The strike at the Paul and Barker jobs did not cause
the other employers to close down their jobs. The construction industry i~ not an integrated production line
husine~s, with all of the mnployers contributing their
part to a finished product, or where the closing of one
job would force the closing of another because of lack
of supplies, parts or services. On the contrary, each

13
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of these employers were competitors, and had bid on the
various jobs. The various contractors could have continued their operations indefinitely, and the strike at
the Paul and Barker jobs would have had no effect whatsoever on their operations.
The lockout of the employees by their employers was
not because of the strike at the Paul and Barker Jobs,
rather such action was affirmative action taken by the
employers to defeat the effect of the strike action of the
unions. These employers, by throwing other union members out of work, obviously hopeing to destroy the effect
of this strike and thus force the unions to tetreat from
their demands. The Unions called a strike at two jobs,
and the affirmative action of the employers closed
down all other jobs, and these claimants became unemployed.
Assume that the strike against the Paul and Barker
jobs was a strike against the entire bargaining unit, as
contended by Appellant. Still this strike did not cause
the other employers to close down their work. Even
though the strike against the two employers may be
,considered against the whole unit, the facts show that no
picket lines were established at the remaining employers
of the unit, and the employees of these non-struck employers did not refuse to work. Even though the employers rnay want to, and in fact did, consider the strike
as being against the entire unit, the fact remains that
there was no strike in progress at the factory or establishment of these employers, to disqualify these claimants under subsection (d) of section 42-2a-5.

14
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The Appellant would apply subsection (1) of subsection (d) of section -!~-~a-5 to the facts present in this
ea::;r. rrhe obviOUS llleaning of ~ubseetion (1) is that it
i::; to be applied only to the employe('~ of one en1ployer.
The applicable portion of this subsection is a~ follow~:
.. ~ * * shall find that a strike has been fmnented by a
worker of any e1nployer, * * *." The only eonclusion that
can be reached from this language is the legislature only
intended to cover the employees of that employer for
whom the worker, "·ho fmnented the strike, worked, and
not to con•r any workers at any other factory or establi::;hment. The clai1nant~ here were working for enlployers who had no connection with the en1ployers
against whon1 the strike was called, except their association in the Associated General Contractors unit, and
there was no strike at their employers job-establishment. Had it not been for the action of the employers of
these claimants, there would have been no unemployment for these claimants and thus no application for
unemployment benefits.
A LABOR DISP1J11 E IS l\fORE THAN A STRIKE
\Ve are not, under the Utah Statute, dealing with
the wide and broad subject of a trade or labor dispute,
as set out in the statutes of other jurisdictions, for instanee England and California; where a trade or labor
dispute bars an e1nployee frmn unemployment eompensation. Perhaps no one kno\vs, or at least no one
has written a satisfaetory definition of a labor or trade
dispute. Prohably because no one understands what

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the limitations of a labor dispute are. The facts of a
labor dispute are legion and its area as broad and sweeping as industrial economics. In industry a trade or
labor dispute can and does 1nean 1nost anything, and
if, as is frequently admitted, the most efficient worker
is the one who is constantly agitating for better conditions, there are thousands of labor disputes to every
strike. In a country where 500 contracts are signed, that
the public never hears about, to every strike, that gets
the headlines; the strike is well understood by most
everyone, both in and out of industry. Therefore to
cmnpare out Utah Statute, that bars con1pensation "because of a strike * * * at the establishment at which he
is or was last employed.", with another statute from
another state which bars unemplopnent compensation
because of a broad, sweeping, complex and far reaching
labor dispute is overdoing analogy, over simplification
and speeding the train of circumstances so fast it runs by
the station.
Suppose the Associated General Contractors had
kept their lockout strategy secret and sprung it without
notice, when the Paul and Barker jobs were picketedwould there be any indubiety respecting the favorable
applicability of our statute to these claimants-of course
not-but the principal involved would be exactly the
same. With or without notice of the lockout, the unions
did not agree to it, the collective contract was silent respecting it and the motive, the strategy, and the conduct
pursuant thereto on the part of the contractors were all
arbitrary and one-sided in terms of the statute, re~pect-
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ing a grade, class or group of workers at an independent
establishment. There was no relationship between the
balance of the jobs and the Paul and Barker jobs. Those
jobs did not interfere one scintilla with the operation of
the numerous other jobs of the contractors. So to contend that these clahnants voluntarily and willingly left
their work because the Paul and Barker jobs were
picketed is untenable and does violence to words and
deeds; for let us again invite the Courts attention to the
words of our statute, "an individual shall be ineligible
• • * for any week * * * that his unemployment is due
• • * because of a strike * * • at the establishment at
which he is or was last employed." Hence, there being no
strike, picket, walkout or any concomitant of a strike at
the claimants' establishment where they were last employed; obviously entitles them to unemployment conlpensation.
Suppose these respective clahnants did not want the
union to represent them and were opposed to labor
unions, but were compelled into sub1nitting to being represented by the union because of a National Labor Relations Board authorization election, in which election
these claiinants voted against the union ; and further
suppose, the union that so represented these anti-union
claimants, because they had no other choice, so long as
claimants worked on a job where a National Labor Relations Board authorization election has been held, called
a strike at a plant which is represented by an association which represents 1000 other similar plants; and
thereafter such association said to the union, "you call

17
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off this strike or we shall shut down every plant in the
Association, where we find non-union men working," and
suppose that the Association did just that. Would it not
be ridiculous to say that the union, representing the
non-union claimants, which called the strike at a single
plant, which provoked the association into unilaterally
closing all other plants, where non-union men worked
and were thrown out of work, and were therefore not
entitled to unemployment cornpensation because the
union forsooth represented locked out non-union employees. This analogy may seem far fetched but the
collective principal is exactly the same circumlocutory
theory ,to which the Association clings in its hypothesis
to connect these claimants with the Paul and Barker
strike through their bargaining agent; and the principal
would still be the same if 499 out of 1,000 voted against
the union at a plant National Labor Relations Board
authorization election, and the same 499 out of 1,000
voted in exactly the same way against the union in a
strike authorization election; just a sample of the difficulty encountered when one attempts to confuse the
broad subject of collective bargaining in labor disputes
with the rather simple and uncomplicated conduct known
as strike action, as conteinplated by our legislature, in
the Utah Unemployrnent Compensation Act.
FINDINGS OF COl\fMISSION CONCLUSIVE
The Industrial Com1nission has conducted hearings
and nmde investigations in this case, and after these
proceedings were completed, it entered its finding of fad
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and conclusions of law herein. In these findings of fact
it found that there was no strike at the factory or establislunent at which these clainmnts are or were last employed, and thus the claimants were not disqualified for
compensation under the act. Section -t2-2a-10 (i) of the
Utah Code . Annotated 1943, provides that in any judicial proceedings the findings of the cominission as to the
facts, if supported by the evidence, shall be conclusive
and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to
questions of law. :Manifestly, sufficient evidence is present herein to sustain the findings of the commission, that
no strike existed at the factory or establishment of these
claimants. This is determinative of the decision in this
cause. Since the Cormnission has found evidence showing that there was not a strike present, the Court should
not, in our hmnble opinion, disturb this finding.
All of which we respectfully submit.
UTAH STATE FEDERATION OF LABOR
CLARENCE ~L BECK
REID W. NIELSON
Attorneys for
Utah State Federation of Labor
As Amicus Curiae.
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